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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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The Honorable Royal Hansen, District Judge 
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Attorney at Law 
Cook, Skeen & Robinson LLC 
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Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
STEVE PRICE 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT? 
JUN 3 - 2005 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
DAVID K GILLETT, an individual, ) 
and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, ) 
INCORPORATED, a Utah ) PETITIONERS' 
corporation, ) OPENING BRIEF FOR 
) CERTIORARI REVIEW 
Plaintiffs-Petitioners ) OF A 
) COURT OF APPEALS 
vs ) DECISION 
STEVE PRICE, an individual, ) 
Defendant-Respondent ) Case No. 2005-0023SC 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Petitioner DAVID K GILLETT is a 
natural person, a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
Plaintiff-Petitioner MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INCORPORATED, 
is a Utah corporation, of which David K Gillett is the 
corporate president and sole shareholder. 
The Defendant-Respondent STEVE PRICE is a natural 
person, a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The "certiorari" review presents and has been 
granted for the single issue presented for review: 
namely, whether the "post-trial" motion for 
reconsideration tolled the running of the "appeal" period 
until the District Court had ruled upon the "motion for 
reconsideration [summary judgment for defendant]". 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Appellants' 
"post-trial" motions did not toll the running of the 30-
day period in which to file the "notice of appeal". 
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court reviews the 
Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals not of the trial 
court for correctness; the conclusions of law of the 
Court of Appeals are afforded no deference. Bear River 
Mutual Insurance Company vs Wall, 978 P. 2d 460 at 461 
(Utah Supreme Court 1999). 
CITATION TO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals decision for which certiorari 
review is sought is incorporated in the "Memorandum 
Decision Not for Official Publication" [hereinafter 
referred to as "the Court of Appeals Decision" or simply 
"the Decision"] in the case of David K Gillett and 
Majestic Air Services, Incorporated vs Steve Price, 2004 
UT App 460 (decided 9 December 2004), Appellate Case No. 
20040682-CA. A photocopy of the Decision is included 
herein as APPENDIX #4 to this Petition. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over the "appeal" originally was 
exercised pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-2-
2(3) (j) , Utah Code [Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction for appeals of civil cases from the District 
Court] . The Utah Supreme Court "poured over" the case to 
the Court of Appeals, which issued the Decision pursuant 
to its sua sponte motion for "summary disposition". 
The Supreme Court has granted the Petitioners' 
request for certiorari review of the Court of Appeals 
Decision. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no operative provisions of constitutional 
and statutory provisions applicable to certiorari review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs' original claim is for "breach of 
contract" by the Defendant, a former employee. The facts, 
essentially undisputed, are that the Defendant, while 
employed as the "Parts Department Manager" of the 
Plaintiff MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES "embezzled" approximately 
$80,000 worth of aviation radios and navigation equipment 
and sold the same to an out-of-state purchaser, at a mere 
fraction of their true value.1 
xThe Defendant PRICE pleaded "guilty" to a federal 
felony of interstate shipment of stolen property. 
The instant "appeal" (to the Court of Appeals) 
presented itself in the context of a "motion for summary 
judgment", in which the Defendant asserted he did not 
"recall" (Defendant's terminology) any "written" 
instrument which would support Plaintiffs' allegations 
(i.e. that the "breach of contract" claim was based upon 
an "instrument in writing"). If the Defendant's 
obligations nevertheless disputed as to nature and 
scope were founded upon an "instrument in writing", 
then the case would be timely filed and the Defendant's 
"motion for summary judgment" (on "statute of 
limitations" grounds) would be unsuccessful. Plaintiffs 
responded by identifying the "written documents" and 
provided authenticated copies thereof to the Defendant 
and to the Court. The Defendant's "motion for summary 
judgment" was originally considered by the District Court 
at the "oral argument" hearing on January 7th, 2004. No 
judgment was announced at that time and the party-
litigants were given the opportunity to conduct pre-trial 
discovery. During his Deposition the Defendant PRICE 
acknowledged the preparation and execution of a two-page 
written document (by him), together with execution (by 
him) of a second 2-page document prepared by his employer 
MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES. 
In April 2004 the Defendant PRICE renewed his 
"motion for summary judgment", essentially along the 
previously-asserted lines (that there was no "instrument 
in writing" upon which the Plaintiffs' "breach of 
contract" claims were based, and thus a 4-year statute of 
limitation was applicable to the case (for "oral" 
contracts and now barred prosecution of the case). 
Plaintiffs responded to the renewed "motion for summary 
judgment" and the case was again argued to the District 
Court, which issued a "Memorandum Decision" on or about 
26 May 2004. 
On or about 9 June 2004 the Plaintiffs filed a 
"Motion for Reconsideration [Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment]". [A photocopy of the Motion for 
Reconsideration is attached hereto as APPENDIX #1. The 
supporting Memorandum of Law is attached hereto as 
APPENDIX #2 . ] 
The "motion for reconsideration" was filed actually 
BEFORE the entry of the "final judgment" (on June 16th). 
On 24 June 2004 the Defendant filed a responsive 
Memorandum of Law. On or about 21 July (ruling) and/or 27 
July (minute entry) 2004 the District Court entered a 
"minute entry" order denying the "motion for 
reconsideration". [See APPENDIX #3.] 
On 1 September 2004 the Court of Appeals, in a sua 
sponte order, raised the issue of the timeliness of the 
filing of the notice of appeal and directed the party-
litigants to respond to that issue, in the context of a 
summary disposition. On or about 2 September 2004 the 
Defendant-Appellee simultaneously filed a "motion for 
summary disposition" concerning the claimed untimely 
filing of the "notice of appeal". 
On 9 December 2004 the Court of Appeals issued its 
per curiam "Memorandum Decision Not for Official 
Publication", signed by a three-member panel. [A 
photocopy of the Court of Appeals Decision is attached 
hereto at APPENDIX #4.] 
ARGUMENT 
THE TIMELY FILING OF THE "POST-TRIAL" MOTION 
TOLLED THE 3 0-DAY PERIOD 
IN WHICH TO FILE THE "NOTICE OF APPEAL" 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires the "notice of appeal" to be filed within 30 
days of the entry of the "final judgment", which would 
have been 16 June 2004 but for the post-judgment 
"motion". 
However, Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure contemplates "post-trial" and/or "post-
judgment" motions and provides in relevant part: 
(b) Motions post-judgment or order. If a timely 
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
for judgment under Rule 50(b), (2) under Rule 
7 
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of 
fact, whether or not an alteration of the 
judgment would be required if the motion is 
granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend 
the judgment, or (4) under Rule 5 9 for a new 
trial, the time for appeal for all parties 
shall run from the entry of the order denying a 
new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. . . . 
Emphasis added. 
Within the instant "Motion for Reconsideration 
[Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment]", and more 
specifically the "Memorandum in Support", are addressed 
numerous "matters of law" in which the Plaintiffs 
asserted the District Court had made "error of law" [see 
Rule 59(a) (7)]. [See APPENDIX #2 to this Petition.] 
The instant situation is not factually and legally 
distinguishable from that presented in the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Gallardo vs Bolinder, 800 P. 2d 
816 (Utah Supreme Court 1990). In Gallardo the Supreme 
Court was faced with a situation involving a "motion for 
relief from judgment", in which the Court of Appeals 
considering the civil case following "pour over" from the 
Supreme Court had concluded the appeal was untimely 
filed. The Utah Supreme Court summarily reversed and 
reinstated the appeal and directed that the appeal be 
considered on the merits in that forum (i.e. Court of 
Appeals). The Supreme Court wrote: 
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A motion for relief from judgment, if filed 
within 10 days after the entry of judgment, 
will be treated as a post-judgment motion 
tolling the time for appeal. "If the nature of 
the motion can be ascertained from the 
substance of the instrument, we have heretofore 
held that an improper caption is not fatal to 
that motion." Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian, 
657 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1983) (citing Howard v. 
Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152, 356 P.2d 275, 276 
(1960) . 
Emphasis added. 800 P.2d at 817. Emphasis added. 
In arriving at its conclusion (i.e. the post-trial 
"motion for relief from judgment" tolled the running of 
the appeal period) the Supreme Court also relied upon the 
provisions of Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which contemplates a "liberal" construction of the Rules 
generally. Id. at 817. If, per Gallardo a "motion for 
relief from judgment" tolls the running of the appeal 
period, then the Plaintiffs' motion should likewise toll 
the appeal period. 
In Watkiss & Campbell vs Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 
(Utah 1991) , the Utah Supreme Court in considering the 
effect of the "motion for reconsideration" wrote: 
Nevertheless, had Foa appropriately entitled 
its motion as one for a new trial, the effect 
would have been to ask the court to reconsider 
the summary judgment, and it would have tolled 
the time period to file an appeal. Under the 
facts of this case, the incorrect title placed 
upon the pleading was not a bar to defendant's 
case. Indeed, the record reflects that the 
judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Because the court 
9 
treated the motion to reconsider as a motion 
for a new trial, we conclude that the filing of 
the motion tolled the time in which to file an 
appeal. Thus, the time period to file an appeal 
began to run against Foa when the judge signed 
the order of denial. Because the court signed 
the order on January 3, 198 9, and Foa timely 
filed its notice of appeal on January 31, 1989, 
we are not without jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. 
808 P. 2d 1064-1065. Emphasis added. Citations (footnotes) 
to cases omitted. 
The foregoing (quoted) text (from Watkiss) is 
essentially what happened in the instant situation. 
Indeed, close examination of the Appellant's "Motion" 
(albeit through the supporting "Memorandum" filed 
concurrently therewith) , has the affirmative request (and 
consequently "the effect", Watkiss, supra) to the trial 
court to "reconsider the summary judgment" [Id. at 1064] . 
To that situation the Supreme Court wrote that the 
"motion for reconsideration" 
" • . . would have tolled the time period to 
file an appeal." 
Id. Emphasis added. 
In Ron Shepherd Insurance, Incorporated vs Shields, 
882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994), the Supreme Court was 
presented with a factual situation not materially 
dissimilar to many of the procedural "facts" (at the 
trial court level) involved in the instant case. In 
10 
Shields the Supreme Court wrote: 
It is settled law that a trial court is free to 
reassess its decision at any point prior to 
entry of a final order of judgment. Bennion v. 
Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985). In the 
present case, because no final order awarding 
defendants summary judgment was signed and 
entered, the matter was still pending when 
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was 
filed in Judge Lewis's court. She had every 
right to fully reassess the matter and, if 
deemed appropriate, to receive additional 
evidence. 
882 P.2d at 654. Emphasis added. 
It was in the above-referenced context that the 
instant "motion for reconsideration1', as in Shields, was 
filed: to point out to the District Court the error of 
its earlier ruling. 
The instant "motion" was very, very timely: 
actually, pre-judgment2. The "motion for reconsideration" 
was actually filed within days of receipt of the District 
Court's "Memorandum Decision". C.f. Salt Lake City 
Corporation vs James Construction, 761 P. 2d 42 (Utah App 
1988), in which the appellant waited almost sixteen 
months after the original summary judgment to file the 
"motion to reconsider": in such an abusive situation, the 
2The "motion for reconsideration" was filed on or 
about June 9th. The actual "summary judgment" was not 
signed and entered until on or about June 16th. The 
"motion for reconsideration" was not resolved by the 
District Court until July 21st. The notice of appeal was 
filed on or about August 4th. 
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"motion to reconsider" obviously should not "toll" or 
effectively "defeat" the 30-day "notice of appeal" 
requirement. 
In Trembly vs Mrs Fields Cookies, 884 P. 2d 13 06 
(Utah App 1994) , the defendant had filed a "motion for 
reconsideration", concerning which the Court of Appeals 
wrote: 
Because the substance, not caption of a motion 
is dispositive in determining the character of 
the motion, see State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 
1044 (Utah App. 1994), we will treat Mrs. 
Fields's motion as a Rule 54(b) motion. 
884 P.2d at 1310. Footnote #2. 
The instant situation is not factually and legally 
distinguishable from that presented in the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Salt Lake Knee 
& Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. vs Salt Lake City Knee & 
Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266 (Utah App 1995), in which 
the Court of Appeals described the filing of a "motion 
for reconsideration" as follows: 
. . . the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Physicians on November 15, 1993. 
Rehabilitation filed a "motion for 
reconsideration" of the trial court ruling on 
November 29, 1993. The trial court heard the 
motion on January 28, 1994, and again ruled in 
favor of Physicians. An order to this effect 
was entered on March 14, 1994. On April 11, 
1994, Rehabilitation filed this appeal. 
909 P. 2d at 268. Concerning the "motion for 
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reconsideration" and/or its effect upon the timeliness of 
the filing of the "notice of appeal", the Court of 
Appeals in Salt Lake Knee further wrote: 
Physicians argues that Rehabilitation's 
motion for reconsideration did not toll the 
running of the time in which to appeal, and 
hence Rehabilitation's appeal was untimely. It 
is by now well established that the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not provide for a "motion 
for reconsideration" of a trial court's ruling. 
Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 
650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 1994); accord Watkiss & 
Campbell v. Foa & Sons, 808 P.2d 1961, 1064 
(Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have "reviewed 
motions so entitled if they could have properly-
been brought under some rule and were merely 
incorrectly titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 
n. 4; see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 
884 P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App. 1994) 
(noting that "the substance, not caption, of a 
motion is dispositive in determining the 
character of the motion"). 
In this case, Rehabilitation captioned its 
motion as a motion for reconsideration. 
However, our review indicates that the 
substance of the motion was essentially 
identical to a motion for new trial under Rule 
59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that the 
trial court made several errors of law which 
are grounds for relief under Rule 59(a) (7) . In 
addition, by conducting a hearing and 
reaffirming its legal conclusions, the trial 
court ruled upon the motion as if it were a 
motion for new trial. Therefore, as in Watkiss 
& Campbell, 
[u] nder the facts of this case, the 
incorrect title placed on the pleading 
was not a bar to the defendant's case. 
Indeed, the record reflects that the 
judge ruled on the motion as if it 
were made for a new trial. Because the 
court treated the motion to reconsider 
as a motion for new trial, we conclude 
that the filing of the motion tolled 
13 
the time in which to file an appeal. 
Id. at 1064-1065 (footnotes omitted). 
We conclude that Rehabilitation' s motion to 
reconsider is substantively a motion for new 
trial, and as such tolled the time for filing 
an appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was timely. 
909 P.2d at 268-269. Emphasis added. Citations to 
footnotes in original have been omitted. 
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, was obviously 
not following even its own previous rulings and 
precedents. That's inherently unfair to the Petitioners, 
who are thus forced to guess as to the trial court's 
handling of the "motion to reconsider". 
Examining the Plaintiffs' "motion for 
reconsideration" (including the supporting Memorandum) 
[APPENDIX #2, hereto], the thrust of the "motion for 
reconsideration" is "substantively" (Salt Lake Knee, 
supra) and "essentially identical" (Salt Lake Knee, 
supra) to a "motion for new trial" and/or, perhaps more 
closely, a motion to "alter or amend judgment" (i.e. to 
not enter the judgment in favor of the Defendant, as the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision was proposing to 
do) . A reading of the Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law 
identifies numerous "errors in law" [see Rule 59(a) (7)] 
which the District Court had made in evaluating the 
claims and the evidence, as reflected in the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision. 
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The Court of Appeals Decision seemingly focuses— 
unreasonably and unrealistically so upon the District 
Court's handling (i.e. "treatment" and/or "construction") 
of the "motion for reconsideration". That methodology 
arguably closely patterning what the District Court 
seemingly did undermines the substantive effect of the 
Watkiss holding, as follows: if the District Court 
concludes the motion should be "treated" as a motion for 
new trial, and does so, then the "motion to reconsider", 
although denied, tolls the running of the appeal period. 
If, however, the District Court does not so "treat" the 
"motion", then arguably the "motion" does not toll 
the running of the appeal period. The dilemma created by 
this result-oriented standard, if allowed to stand, is 
unfair and unwise and contradicts this Court's directive 
in Watkiss and the other cases. An unduly rigid, result-
oriented (i.e. examine how the trial court "treats" the 
motion, rather than looking at the motion itself) 
discourages the laudatory effect the instant "motion" (to 
reconsider) had: of pointing out to the District Court 
the obvious inconsistencies within its "Memorandum 
Decision", upon which a proposed "judgment" would be 
based. Because the moving party could not necessarily 
anticipate the District Court's resolution of the 
15 
"reconsideration" issues placed before the District 
Court, the movant is at a severe disadvantage: if the 
District Court rules on the "motion" (and denies the 
same) later than the 30-day period in which to file a 
"notice of appeal", arguably the movant is thus precluded 
from seeking appellate review: the worst of all 
scenarios. If time is perceived to be "short", the other 
side of that "Hobson's choice" dilemma manifests itself: 
the moving party, out of uncertainty as to the trial 
court's "treatment" of the motion is motivated to file a 
"notice of appeal", which effectively deprives the 
District Court of all continuing jurisdiction over the 
case. Both scenarios deprive the District Court of an 
opportunity to "self-correct" the Court's erroneous 
ruling. Similarly, both scenarios unnecessarily impose 
upon the appellate courts an unnecessary burden, which if 
the District Court had the opportunity to fix, might not 
be thrust upon the appellate courts and upon the party-
litigants. While the Court of Appeals (as are all 
appellate courts) is understandably concerned about 
uniform and consistent application of the "30-day rule" 
for filing the "notice of appeal", given the 
uncertainties which will arise from the standards 
established by the Decision are unfair and unwise. While 
16 
the Court of Appeals desires timely filed appeals, it 
would seem that a "motion for reconsideration", the 
"substantively" and "essentially identical" to a "motion 
for new trial" and/or a "motion to alter or amend 
judgment" should have the effect of tolling the running 
of the "appeal period". Otherwise, the trial court is 
effectively deprived of the opportunity to "self-correct" 
its own facially-obvious errors of judgment. A hard-and-
fast rule, applied with Draconian rigor, will not result 
in fewer appeals; on the contrary, such will result in 
more appeals to the appellate courts, as non-prevailing 
counsel unwilling to risk the loss of appeal 
altogether will simply forego the opportunity to ask 
the District Court to "self-correct" the problem. 
Given the seemingly uncertain standards to be 
applied, the Supreme Court should resolve the problem, at 
least for the sake of practitioners who are arguably left 
to guess as to a trial court's future ruling. 
Similarly, the Rules ought not be applied in a rigid 
"timing" or "sequential" manner, to deprive a party who 
has acted in a timely and good faith manner, from 
pursuing an appeal in those cases where the District 
Court, given the opportunity to fix the errors arising 
from its "judgment" as first reflected in its "Memorandum 
17 
Decision" refuses to change the "Judgment" entered 
thereon. 
Thus, until the District Court ruled (on or about 21 
July 2004) to deny the "motion", the time for filing the 
"notice of appeal" was tolled. Thus, the 4 August 2004 
filing of the "notice of appeal" was timely. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs' "motion for reconsideration" was 
"substantively" (Salt Lake Knee, supra) and "essentially 
identical" (Salt Lake Knee, supra) to a "motion for new 
trial" and/or, perhaps more closely, a motion to "alter 
or amend judgment" (i.e. to not enter the judgment in 
favor of the Defendant, as the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision was proposing to do) . The Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Law identified numerous "errors in law" 
[see Rule 59(a) (7)] which the District Court had made in 
evaluating the claims and the evidence, as reflected in 
the District Court's Memorandum Decision. The appellate 
courts should encourage not penalize this kind of 
attempt to point out to the trial court the opportunity 
and necessity to "self-correct" errors within its 
adjudicative decisions. 
The Decision of the Court of Appeals readily 
conflicts with previous decisions of other panels of the 
18 
Court of Appeals deciding the same issue: Mrs Fields 
Cookies, supra, and Salt Lake Knee, supra. 
The Decision of the Court of Appeals readily 
conflicts with previous decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court: Gallardo, supra, Shields, supra, and Watkiss & 
Campbell, supra, and other appellate cases cited therein. 
The Supreme Court should reverse the Court of 
Appeals Decision and reinstate the appeal. The Supreme 
Court should remand the case as in Gallardo back to 
the Court of Appeals, with directions to hear the 
substantive appeal on the merits (propriety of summary 
judgment). 
The Supreme Court apart from the "appeal" 
(certiorari review) process in this case ought to also 
consider an "amendment" to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
if only to clarify the issue and bring the text of the 
"Rules" into conformity with the announced "case law". 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 2005. 
DAVID K GILLETT and 
MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES, INC. 
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The Plaintiffs DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES move 
the Court to reconsider its decision concerning the Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. 
The factual and legal basis of this Motion for Reconsideration 
are more fully described in PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT] 
Civil No. 030401300 
Case assigned to Judge Burton 
The Plaintiffs DAVID K GILLETT and MAJESTIC AIR SERVICES file 
the following PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION [DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT]. 
ARGUMENT 
The single dispositive issue-at-hand is whether or not the 
pleaded "cause of action" against the Defendant falls within the 6-
year statute of limitation set by Section 78-12-23, Utah Code. That 
Section provides in relevant part: 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(2) upon any contract/ obligation, or 
EXHIBIT #2 
liability founded upon an instrument in 
writing, . . . 
Emphasis added. Reference to the specific terms of the statute are 
pertinent, so as to not fall into the narrowing "trap" of thinking 
(or remembering) that the statute applies only to "written 
contracts". The statute says "obligation, or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing . . .". 
The former employer-employee relationship existing between 
Plaintiff MAJESTIC and Defendant STEVE PRICE, especially in his 
role as "Parts Manager" in which he stole the 32 radios entrusted 
to him, is, for these purposes a contractual relationship: the 
employee provides personal services in furtherance of the 
employer's needs and expectations, and the employer pays the 
employee. The "instrument in writing" in this case can be the "job 
description" and the employee's "proposal" both of which 
Defendant PRICE signed. 
The Court has characterized the two waitings as "written 
preliminary proposals". Such is not only inaccurate, but the 
dispute as to what those writings actually are, is the very 
"genuine dispute as to material fact" which should for that 
reason alone preclude the Court from granting summary judgment. 
The PRICE proposal was the operative representation, by the 
employee, under which he solicited AND RECEIVED the promotion to 
Parts Manager. The "job description" describes the expected duties 
and responsibilities. 
The "job description"—in specific and in general tone — 
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expressly states that the employer "expects" that "honesty and 
integrity are the benchmark of performance". For Defendant PRICE to 
have secretly stolen the 32 radios, sent those radios to Florida, 
and personally pocketed the proceeds from the illicit sale, 
certainly violates that "obligation" (to be honest). 
In any event, the fact alone that the parties disagree over 
the legal effect of the written instruments is the "genuine 
dispute" as to material fact which should preclude the summary 
judgment! 
The Defendant, through counsel, has raised the "contract to 
hold property" as an issue. It is unfortunate that the Court has 
seemingly "bought into" that argument. That "hold property" 
phrasing was never part of the Plaintiff's pl.eaded claims, which 
focus more upon an "entrustment" (Paragraph ,13 and 14 of the 
Complaint) concept. The issue is whether or not the Defendant's 
obligation arises from the "instrument in writing", as the statute 
of limitation is so worded. In that context, the Defendant has not 
shown otherwise. [The Defendant's only affidavit was to the effect 
that he didn't recall signing anything. Well, his recollection was 
inaccurate.] 
For the record: the Plaintiffs NEVER have claimed or pleaded 
a "bailment" issue, in the classic usage of that concept. The 
"bailment" idea was merely the invention and/or mischaracter;ization 
of the Plaintiff's claims by the Defendant's counsel. The 
"bailment" claim—as such never raised—was consequently not 
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"abandoned", as the Court incorrectly notes. 
The Court has seemingly focused upon the term "hold property". 
That phrase is not in the contract. But it is not necessarily in 
the pleading. The pleading speaks for itself. The complaint 
satisfies the requires of Utah law for "notice pleading". 
The Court characterizes—mischaracterizes is probably more 
accurate the two written instrument as "written preliminary 
proposals". This is an incorrect assessment, of both fact and law. 
The characterization OVERLOOKS the evidence, and/or the disputed 
evidence: namely, that Mr Gillett through Affidavit testified 
in essence that: 
1. He relied upon PRICE'S representations and promoted 
him to the Parts Manager position. 
2. Within that Parts Manager position, PRICE was 
entrusted with the custody of the radios, etc., for which 
he was supposed to carefully account for and to "better 
parts and inventory control and management." 
3. In that setting, Price in breach of his 
"obligations and responsibilities (Section 78-12-23 
utilizes the term "liabilities") stole the radios: he 
took the radios from the constructive custody of 
Majestic, sent the radios to Florida, pocketed the $$$ 
into his personal checking account, and would have gone 
undetected, but for a fortuitous event unrelated to the 
actual theft. 
4 
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The point is that it is insignificant that the written instruments 
do not specifically utilize the phrase "to hold property". The 
whole idea is implicit in the "Parts Manager" concept. That's what 
Parts Managers do. That was understood by all parties. 
In Durham vs Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court observed: from page 1334. 
The summary judgement procedure has the desirable and 
salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and 
expense of a trial when there are no issues of fact in 
dispute and the controversy can be resolved as a matter 
of law. Nevertheless, that should not be done on 
conjecture, but only when the matter is clear; and in 
case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in allowing 
the challenged party the opportunity of at least 
attempting to prove his right to recover. For that 
reason the "submissions" should be looked at in the light 
favorable to her position; and unless the court is able 
to conclude that there is no dispute on material facts, 
which if resolved in her favor would entitle her to 
recover, the court should not summarily reject her claim 
and render judgment against her as a matter of law. Upon 
review, -we apply the same standard as that applied by 
the trial court. 
571 P.2d at 1334. Emphasis added. Citations to footnotes omitted. 
See also Diamond B-Y Ranches vs Tooele County, 2004 UT App 135 
(Utah Court of Appeals, 29 April 2004), S 13. 
The Court's ruling, in favor of the Defendant on the 
"genuinely disputed issue of material fact" (i.e. the operative 
nature of the "obligation based upon an instrument in writing") 
does the very thing which Margetts and Diamond B-Y Ranches says 
trial courts are not to do! 
The heart and essence of the Court's ruling—thus 
necessitating this Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration—is 
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illuminated by the Court's "memorandum decision" and particularly 
by the Defendant's proposed "finding #8" in the "Findings and Order 
of Summary Judgment", thus: 
8. The Court finds that, viewing the facts in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs, the written documents 
provided by Plaintiffs failed to show that there was a 
written contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant to hold 
property on behalf of Plaintiffs and that the parties' 
agreement was oral. 
Emphasis added. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court concludes 
that the parties' "agreement was oral", thus invoking the 4-year 
statute of limitation. This illogical conclusion directly in the 
face of the evidence (i.e. there WAS A WRITTEN AGREEMENT, ala the 
"proposal" signed by the Defendant to get the "Parts Department 
Manager" position AND the "job description" for the "Parts Manager" 
position, ALSO SIGNED by the Defendant) simply doesn't follow, 
for numerous reasons. 
First, because there was a "written agreement", signed by 
the Defendant. Within the employer-employee relationship 
reflected by those written documents. 
Secondly, it is incredible for the Court to conclude 
there is "no written contract" when the very written 
documents are quite literally before the Court! 
[Plaintiffs claim the "job description" (i.e. "honesty 
and integrity are the benchmarks of performance") define 
the "obligation and liability" based upon the "instrument 
in writing", sufficient for the statute. 
The Court, in its Ruling, "finds" that there is no genuine 
6 
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dispute as to material fact. Such is patently in error, given the 
Court's additional finding that the "contract" between the parties 
was "oral". 
On Page 6 of the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court 
correctly frames the issue before the Court, thus: 
The issue, therefore, is whether there was a written 
contract for Defendant to hold property on behalf of 
Plaintiff. If so, then the original complaint was timely 
filed and the saving statute would apply to the present 
complaint and the proposed amended complaint. If, 
however, there was no written contract for Defendant to 
hold property on behalf of Plaintiff, then the original 
complaint was untimely and the savings statute does not 
apply. 
Upon review of the written documents, the Court concludes 
that even viewing the written documents in a light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, the written documents 
proffered by Plaintiff fail to show that there was a 
written contract between Plaintiff and Defendant to hold 
property on behalf of Plaintiff; therefore, the parties 
agreement was o r a l . . . . 
Emphasis added. 
The phrase "to hold property on behalf of Plaintiff", as 
recited by the Court as quoted above, is not per se material or 
critical to the case or its summary judgment disposition. The 
phrase was "coined" and utilized by the Defendant, in "moving 
target fashion", as the Defendant has tried to distort the facts, 
by saying that the written agreements were -"merely employment 
agreements". As if that phrasing had a specialized term-of-art 
significance under the law; it doesn't. [Does the fact th^t it is 
an "employment contract" not implicitly admit the existence of "a 
contract", thus precluding judgment in favor of the Defendant, as 
7 
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a matter of law?] 
The actual phrasing of the Plaintiffs complaint at 
paragraphs 13 and 14 utilize the phrasing of "property entrusted 
to the Defendant" in his Parts Manager capacity. In light of the 
"notice pleading" as allowed by Utah, even this "notice pleading" 
brevity is sufficient to apprise the Defendant who knows exactly 
what he is being sued for and the specifics of the incident and his 
conduct therein which are the basis for the liability. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision is facially inconsistent. The "written" 
documents presented and the interpretation to be given thereto, 
particularly when the two sides themselves cannot agree 
constitute the very "genuine dispute as to material fact" which 
precludes summary judgment. 
The Court should reconsider its ruling. The Defendant's motion 
(for summary judgment) must be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th of June, 2004. 
original signed 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
[DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] to be mailed, first-class 
postage prepaid, to Mr Randall L Skeen, Attorney at Law, Cook, 
Skeen & Robinson, LLC, 5788 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121, this 9th day of June, 2004. 
original signed by SGH 
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Case No 030401300 
Judge ROYAL I HANSEN 
Defendant 
The above mattei comes before the Court for decision on David K Gillett and Majestic 
Air Services, Incorporated's (Plaintiffs) motion for reconsideration By way of memorandum 
decision the Court granted Steve Price's motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2004. 
Plaintiffs now challenge that memorandum decision Upon review of the parties filings and the 
Court's previous decision, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs motion fails to satisfy the standard 
for relief Accordingly, Plainuits motion for ieconsideration is DENIED. 
Dated this "M clay of July, 2004 By the Court*...;' ' / % 
ROYAL I HANSEN 
Third District Court Judge 
EXHIBIT #3 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






Case No: 030401300 
Judge: ROYAL I HANSEN 
Date: 07/27/2004 
Clerk: dwank 
UPON REVIEW OF THE PARTIES FILINGS AND THE COURT'S PREVIOUS 
DECISION, THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT PLAINTIFFS MOTION FAILS TO 
SATISFY THE STANDARD FOR RELIEF. ACCORDINGLY, PLAINTIFFS MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DENIED. 






Decision of the Court of Appeals [2004 UT App 460] 
Appellate Case No. 2004-0682CA 
[9 December 2004] 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 0 9 2004 
IN THE UT£H COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
David K Gillett and Majestic 
Air Services, Inc a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v 
Steve Price, 
Defendant and Appellee 
Third District, Sandy Depaitmenl 
The Honorable Royal I Hansen 
Attorneys Stephen G Homer, West Jordan, for Appellants 
Randall L Skeen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM-
This matter is before the court on motions by this court and 
Appellee Steve Price for summaiy dismissal on the basis of lack 
of jurisdiction See Utah R App P 10 The civil claim filed 
in district court related to allegations of theft of property. 
The district court granted Price's motion for summary judgment in 
an order issued on June 16, 2004. 
In response to the court'c order, Appellant David Gillett 
filed a motion captioned "Plaintiffs' Motion For Reconsideration 
[Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment]." This motion was 
filed on June 9, 2004, after tne initial ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment was made but prior to issuance of the final 
order Gillett argued m the motion for reconsideration that the 
district court mischaiactenzect the documents relied upon in 
determining the statute oi limitations had expired on Gillett1s 
claim Gillett also argued m the motion that factual issues 
existed and, as a result, sumniry judgment was improper. 
Gillett ' s notice of appeal, was filed on August 4, 2004. The 
notice of appeal was not timely filed from the order granting 
summary judgment, which was tb- final judgment. While Gillett's 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No 20040682-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 9, 2004) 
[2004 UT App 460 
EXHIBIT #4 
notice of appeal purports to appeal the denial of his motion to 
reconsider, he argues in his response to the motions for summary 
dismissal that the motion to reconsider should be construed as 
either a motion to alter or amend judgment or a motion for a new 
trial, pursuant to rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. He cites Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. 
Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 
1995) and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1065 
(Utah 1991), in support of his proposition. 
If construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment or a 
motion for a new trial, Gillett's notice of appeal would be 
timely because these are post-trial motions, enumerated in rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which toll the 
time for filing a notice of appeal until thirty days after 
issuance of an order denying the post-trial motion. See Watkiss 
& Campbell, 808 P.2d at 1064. 
Gillett's motion, however, is not properly construed as a 
motion to amend or alter judgment or as a motion for a new trial. 
There is no indication that the trial court construed Gillett's 
motion as either a motion to alcer or amend the judgment or as a 
motion for a new trial. Furthermore, the motion does not meet 
the requirements for either motion. 
This court reviews the rulings of the trial court. 
Therefore, this court considers whether the trial court has 
abused its discretion in construing, or not construing, a motion 
to reconsider as a motion that tolls the time for filing a notice 
of appeal. Nothing in the district court's order denying 
Gillett's motion indicates that the court construed Gillett's 
motion as anything other than a motion to reconsider. Thus the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
construe the motion as a rule 4(b) motion, especially given that 
the motion does not meet the requirements of a rule 59 motion. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) , (e) . 
Because Gillett's notice of appeal was timely from the order 
denying the motion to reconsider, the question remains whether 
this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order. 
Because the rules of civil procedure do not allow for a motion to 
reconsider, such a motion will be reviewed only if it could been 
properly brought under a rule, based on its substance, but was 
incorrectly captioned. See Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
Rehabilitation, 909 P.2d at 268. As we have already explained, 
Gillette's motion cannot be construed as a motion made under the 
rules of civil procedure. 
20040682-CA 2 
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For the forgoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction because of an untimely notice of appeal 
Price seeks attorney fees and costs based on rules 33 and 34 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Price has not 
sufficiently argued, and we do not conclude, that this appeal was 
frivolous or for purposes of delay We therefore decline to 
award attorney fees Costs are awarded by operation of rule 
34 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
lith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
W[ , ^JJ4^P^ 
Russell W Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
£^ ?£gory K. Orme, Judge 
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